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1. Introduction 
Some of our beliefs are justified, if indeed they are justified, only because they stand in inferential relations 
to other beliefs. And some of those latter beliefs are justified, if indeed they are justified, only because they 
stand in inferential relations to yet other beliefs. Where does this regress end? As the traditional story goes, 
there are four main options. According to foundationalists, the regress terminates in a set of beliefs each of 
whose justification does not depend on its inferential relations to any other beliefs. According to infinitists, 
the regress goes on without end. According to coherentists, the regress eventually loops back on itself. And 
according to skeptics of a certain sort, because none of these alternatives is satisfactory, all of our beliefs are 
unjustified. 
 It is customary to use directed graphs to depict these different takes on the justificatory structure of a 
subject’s beliefs at a given time. For instance, we might draw a directed graph in which the nodes 
represent our subject’s beliefs and the arrows represent inferential relations between those beliefs, like so: 
 
Figure 1 
Directed graphs of this sort are an extremely useful—indeed, almost indispensable—tool for thinking 
about the structure of justification. But despite the ubiquity of directed graphs in discussions of 
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foundationalism, infinitism, and coherentism, the full power of this tool is rarely harnessed. A number of 
important distinctions are often overlooked or ignored in an effort to keep things simple. 
 For example, although the lines of support for actual beliefs held by actual subjects are usually the 
sort of ramifying mess found in Figure 1, authors frequently clean up this mess in order to make the 
regress of justification easier to state. As I will put it, these authors replace the ramifying regress, in which 
some beliefs are supported by multiple beliefs, with the serial regress, in which each belief is supported by at 
most one belief. The standard way of doing this is to assume that whenever a belief in P is supported by a 
belief in Q1 and a belief in Q2, this is justificatorily equivalent to a case in which a belief in P is supported 
by a single belief in the conjunctive proposition Q1 & Q2.1 
 
Figure 2 
With this assumption in place, the basic issue dividing foundationalists, infinitists, and coherentists can be 
stated all too easily: which of the following justificatory structures does one prefer? 
 
Figure 3 
However, this simplification of the issues is not without its costs. For once the non-skeptical alternatives 
have been portrayed in this manner, the coherentist option looks, to put it bluntly, stupid—a wholly 
unattractive position that only a truly desperate philosopher would endorse. How can a mere circle of 
support, of whatever length, make a belief appropriate to hold? It is no coincidence that coherentists tend 




⇒ P Q1 & Q2
. . . 
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that gets washed out when we assimilate a ramifying regress into a serial regress. 
 What follows shall essentially be a more detailed elaboration of this basic point. I will first 
introduce three distinctions that it is important to keep track of when using directed graphs to represent 
justificatory structure. Then I will demonstrate the importance of these distinctions by showing how they 
can help us solve a variety of puzzles that arise when attempts are made to formulate a viable form of 
coherentism. In particular, I think these distinctions give us the tools both (a) to respond to several 
important objections to coherentism and (b) to provide that most elusive of elements in a coherence theory 
of justification, namely a substantive, non-metaphorical characterization of what coherence amounts to. 
 So really this essay has two independent goals. First, it is a defense of the importance of paying 
attention to three distinctions when using directed graphs to depict justificatory structure. This is a topic 
that should be of interest to all epistemologists—foundationalists, infinitists, coherentists, and skeptics 
alike. (Although the debate among these camps is not as fashionable as it once was, this is not an issue that 
is going away: every epistemological theory must take a stand on the regress of justification, even if only 
implicitly.) Second, this paper is a defense of what we might call a graph-theoretic approach to the notion 
of coherence at the heart of coherentism. This approach is in marked contrast to the two approaches that 
dominate contemporary discussions of coherentism. According to the first, coherence is formulated in 
terms of probabilistic relations among the contents of one’s beliefs.2 According to the second, coherence is 
determined by a weighted sum of various factors that come in degrees, such as the degree of 
connectedness among one’s total system of belief or the degree to which that system does not contain 
anomalous beliefs.3 Although I will only briefly touch in the current essay on why I think so, in my 
opinion both of these approaches are, without supplementation, inherently limited in what they can tell us 
about the nature of coherence. A much more promising approach, I will suggest, is to take coherence to 
be a graph-theoretic property of the structure of support for a given belief. 
 One last comment before I proceed. There are two main ways of representing a directed graph. 
The first is pictorially, using the sorts of drawings found in Figures 1–3. The second way, preferred by 
mathematicians, is to characterize a directed graph in terms of an ordered pair whose first component is a 
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set of objects—the graph’s vertices (or nodes)—and whose second component is a set of ordered pairs of 
those objects—the graph’s directed edges (or arcs). For example, <{v1, v2, v3}, {<v2, v1>, <v3, v2>}> is a 
way of representing the leftmost graph in Figure 3 via this second method. Since the current essay is 
intended as a non-technical introduction to the importance of observing certain distinctions when 
thinking about the justificatory regress, as much as possible I restrict myself to pictorial means of 
characterizing directed graphs. I make full use of the mathematical theory of directed graphs, in all its 
abstract glory, in a more technical companion piece to this article.4 
2. Preliminaries 
Let me start with some clarificatory remarks. 
 First, the main normative notion that I will be focusing on in this essay is justified belief. Many of 
the issues to be discussed here arise for other normative categories in epistemology, such as reason for belief, 
evidence, and knowledge. Some justified beliefs are inferential in nature; but so, too, are some reasons for 
belief, bits of evidence, and pieces of knowledge based in inferential relations. The former gives rise to a 
regress of justification; but so, too, do the latter give rise to analogous regresses of reasons, of evidence, 
and of knowledge. I have fixed on justification as my normative category of choice in this essay mainly for 
familiarity’s sake: almost all of the most important discussions of epistemic regresses in the post-Gettier era 
have been framed in terms of “justification”-talk. Variants of every point I will be making hold for the 
other normative categories as well. 
 Second, by “justification” I mean “sufficient overall epistemic justification.” (I almost always omit 
these qualifiers for brevity’s sake.) In particular, I will not be considering the conditions under which one 
might have a practical rather than an epistemic justification for believing something. Similarly, I will 
concentrate my discussion on whether one has sufficient overall justification to believe a certain thing, not on 
whether one has pro tanto (or prima facie) justification to believe that thing. In many contexts this second 
distinction is of the utmost importance, but suppressing it for the purposes of the current essay will bring 
the structural distinctions I want to make into better focus. 
 Third, in this essay I will only be considering the justificatory structure of the beliefs held by a 
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single person at a single point in time. For other purposes, it might be useful to consider directed graphs in 
which there are nodes for the beliefs of more than one person. Moreover, according to some 
epistemological theories, it is inferential relations between one’s beliefs at different times that are relevant 
to the justificatory regress. However, variants of the structural points I want to make also arise for these 
social and diachronic approaches to the structure of justification, so it will be harmless to frame my 
discussion within the confines of an individualistic, synchronic approach to justification and it grounds. 
 Fourth, I will be helping myself to notions of deductive, inductive, and abductive inferential 
support between propositions without pausing much to ask what these things come to. There are difficult 
questions here that need answering. What exactly is it for one proposition to deductively entail another? 
What is it for a set of propositions to provide adequate inductive support for another? What differentiates 
abductive from inductive support, if indeed they are distinct varieties of support? Since my main concern 
is elsewhere, I will simply assume that satisfactory answers to these questions can be provided. 
 Fifth, in addition to talk of deductive, inductive, and abductive support relations between 
propositions, it will be useful to have a way of referring to deductive, inductive, and abductive support 
among beliefs. When (i) subject S believes P, Q1, . . . , Qn, and (ii) P is deductively, inductively, or 
abductively supported by Q1, . . . , Qn, I will say that (iii) S’s belief in P is supported by S’s belief in Q1, . . . , 
S’s belief in Qn.5 This terminology is fairly standard in the coherentism literature. Consider, for example, 
the common claim that coherent beliefs must be mutually supporting: it is difficult to make sense of this 
idea without defining support among beliefs roughly as I have.6 
 My final clarificatory remark is perhaps the most important: I will only be considering varieties of 
positive support in this essay. This is a gross oversimplification, since just as beliefs can support each other 
via deductive, inductive, and abductive links, so too can beliefs be in tension with one another. (Think, for 
example, of contradictory beliefs.) However, matters will already get complex enough when we restrict 
ourselves to an investigation of positive support relations, so I leave it as a task for another occasion to 
extend the framework developed here so as to take into account negative structural relations among 
beliefs. 
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3. Three Distinctions 
With these preliminaries in place, I can now explain the three distinctions that will be the main focus of 
our discussion. Whenever one draws a directed graph for philosophical purposes, it is absolutely essential 
to ask, “What exactly do the nodes represent? And what exactly do the arrows represent?” The answer to 
the first of these questions might seem easy in the case at hand. Surely, it might be insisted, the nodes in 
our graphs of justificatory structure represent our subject’s beliefs. More generally, we might take the 
nodes to represent any of the following doxastic states or entities: 
• beliefs (either occurrent or standing); 
• suspensions of judgment; 
• credences; 
• dispositions to be in one of the above doxastic states; 
• propositions accessible to one of the above doxastic states. 
I agree that it is important to include doxastic nodes of these sorts in our directed graphs.  However, we 
need not stop there. For there is nothing to bar us from incorporating nodes that represent other sorts of 
justificatorily-relevant entities into our graphs. A prime candidate: many theorists hold that a subject’s 
perceptual experiences are justificatorily relevant (in these sense that they either partially or entirely make 
it the case that the subject is justified in believing something), and if this is so, then it will be useful to have 
a way of including perceptual experiences in our diagrams of justificatory structure. Similarly, some 
theorists hold that (i) intuitions are not a species of belief, and (ii) intuitions are justificatorily relevant. And 
so on: for every kind of mental entity which a theorist takes to ground justification, we can include a 
distinctive sort of node for that kind of entity. Such non-doxastic nodes could include any of the following: 
• perceptual experiences; 
• intuitions; 
• graspings of meaning; 
• memory impressions; 
• emotions. 
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This leads to the first distinction on which I want to focus: 
distinction #1 (doxastic nodes vs. non-doxastic nodes): In addition to nodes representing doxastic states 
(such as beliefs), we can include in our directed graphs nodes representing non-doxastic states 
(such as perceptual experiences). 
In what follows, I will take standing beliefs to be my primary example of a doxastic node, and I will take 
perceptual experiences to be my primary example of a non-doxastic node. (Hereafter I drop the 
“standing” and “perceptual” qualifiers.) I will use a convention whereby a belief node is designated by a 
circle and an experience node is designated by a star. I take no stand on whether experiences have 
propositional or conceptual content, content of a non-propositional or non-conceptual sort, or no content 
at all. 
 Eventually I will be showing how distinction #1 is of use to coherentists. But an immediate 
application of this distinction arises in the case of foundationalism. As has often been remarked, there are 
three main accounts that foundationalists give of basic beliefs (the non-inferentially or immediately justified 
beliefs upon which, according to foundationalists, all other justified beliefs rest): some foundationalists 
hold that basic beliefs are self-justifying; some foundationalists hold that basic beliefs are non-justified7 
justifiers (i.e. they themselves are not in need of justification even though they can confer justification on 
other beliefs); and some foundationalists hold that basic beliefs are justified in virtue of standing in a 
certain sort of relation to some state such as an experience which acts as an non-justified justifier. The 
difference between these three varieties of foundationalism, at least for an individual line of support, can 






Without our first distinction, it would be impossible to graphically represent the difference between the 
second and third of these forms of foundationalism. 
 Earlier I said that whenever one employs directed graphs for philosophical purposes, it is crucial 
to ask two questions: “What exactly do the nodes represent? And what exactly do the arrows represent?” 
Let us turn now to the second of these questions. It might seem that the answer to this question is also 
easy—in fact, it might seem that we have already answered it. Don’t the arrows just represent relations of 
either deductive or inductive or abductive support (or some combination thereof)? One reason that this 
isn’t quite right has to do with the distinction just mentioned. In the bottom graph in Figure 4, the arrow 
between the experience node and the rightmost belief node isn’t deductive, inductive, or abductive; 
instead it is some sort of sui generis relation of perceptual support, as we might call it. So we should be more 
expansive in our conception of the varieties of support that an arrow can represent: these might include 
relations of deductive support, inductive support, abductive support, perceptual support, and perhaps 
other varieties of support as well (such as intuitive support and introspective support, if there be such), in 
addition to combinations of these support relations.8 
 However, there is a deeper reason why we have not yet fully answered our second question. 
Sometimes, in directed graphs of justificatory structure, the arrows are used to represent relations of support, 
and sometimes they are used to represent the flow or transmission of justification; in fact, they are usually taken 
to represent both at the same time. For example, suppose the following is one part of a given directed 
graph of justificatory structure: 
 
Figure 5 
(When needed, I include in my graphs a name for the proposition believed inside each belief node.) This 
part of a graph is frequently taken to represent the fact that our subject S’s belief in proposition P is 
deductively, inductively, or abductively supported by S’s belief in proposition Q. But just as frequently, 
and often at the same time, this part of a graph is taken to represent the fact that, because S’s belief in Q is 
justified and because S’s belief in Q inferentially supports S’s belief in P,9 S’s belief in P is justified: 
P Q
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justification flows from one belief to the other. 
 This dual role for a single feature in a graph is unfortunate, especially since distinct claims are 
being made here: a relation of support is not the same as a flow of justification, even if the latter always 
obtains (partially) in virtue of the former. For example, suppose Q = <I will live forever> and P = <I will 
live for two hundred more years>. Q deductively supports P, but it is easy enough to imagine a case in 
which, although I believe both Q and P, I am—alas—not justified in believing either. But if my beliefs in 
P and in Q are not justified, there cannot be a transmittance of justification between them: justification 
juice cannot flow from one to the other when it is not present in either. So this is a case in which although 
Figure 5 would be part of a complete diagram of the justificatory structure of my beliefs were the arrow 
interpreted as a relation of support, it is not part of that diagram when the arrow is interpreted as a flow of 
justification. Hence the second distinction to which I think it is important to pay attention: 
distinction #2 (relations of support vs. flows of justification): Arrows representing relations of support 
between nodes should be distinguished from arrows representing flows of justification. 
To avoid any ambiguity on this front, I will be using a convention whereby (i) arrows in my graphs always 
designate relations of support; (ii) a shadow under a node signifies that it is justified; and (iii) a shadow 
under an arrow signifies that justification is flowing or being transmitted along that line of support. (Note 
that a lack of a shadow in a diagram does not necessarily signify a lack of justification or a lack of 
justificatory flow: sometimes I will not be concerned with marking the presence or absence of justification 
in a diagram.) Thus the following graph: 
 
Figure 6 
is a compact way of representing all of the following: S believes P (the left circle); S believes Q (the right 
circle); S’s belief in Q supports her belief in P (the arrow); S’s belief in P is justified (the shadow under the 
left circle); S’s belief in Q is justified (the shadow under the right circle); and S’s belief in P is justified 
because S’s belief in Q is justified and supports her belief in P (the shadow under the arrow). 
 Distinction #1 concerns the interpretation of nodes in directed graphs depicting justificatory 
P Q
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structure, and distinction #2 concerns the interpretation of arrows in such graphs. The last distinction I 
want to stress concerns both nodes and arrows at once. When we speak of two belief nodes supporting a 
third belief node (whether deductively, inductively, or abductively), this sort of talk is ambiguous. 
Sometimes we mean that each of the two belief nodes independently supports the third, as when a belief in P 
and a belief in Q each on their own deductively support a belief in the disjunction P ∨ Q. And sometimes 
we mean that the two belief nodes jointly support the third, as when a belief in P and a belief in P ⊃ Q 
together deductively support a belief in Q. These are different structural relations between nodes, and it is 
crucial that we be able to represent this difference in our directed graphs, like so: 
 
Figure 7 
The left of these I call “v-support,” and the right I call “y-support.” (To see why, tilt your head to the 
right.) I will also use “v-support” and “y-support” to refer to generalizations of these support structures in 
which three or more nodes each independently support a node (in the case of v-support) or together 
support a node (in the case of y-support). This gives us 
distinction #3 (v-support vs. y-support): We should have a way of depicting the difference between 
several nodes each independently supporting some node (v-support) and several nodes together 
supporting some node (y-support). 
In many ways, this third and final distinction is the crux of my graph-theoretic approach to formulating 
and defending coherentism. 
 Four comments about the v- vs. y-support distinction are in order. First, once we include instances 
of y-support in our graphs of justificatory structure, then strictly speaking we are no longer drawing 
“directed graphs,” as mathematicians use that term. Rather, we are now drawing what mathematicians 
call “directed hypergraphs”: a generalization of directed graphs in which the directed edges can have 
multiple tails or multiple heads. Second, in addition to the distinction between relations of v- and y-








following two facts obtain: 
[S’s belief in P is justified because (S’s belief in Q1 is justified and S’s belief in P is supported by S’s 
belief in Q1)], 
[S’s belief in P is justified because (S’s belief in Q2 is justified and S’s belief in P is supported by S’s 
belief in Q2)] 
is a typical example of a v-flow. By contrast, a case in which the following single fact obtains: 
[S’s belief in P is justified because (S’s belief in Q1 is justified and S’s belief in Q2 is justified and S’s 
belief in P is y-supported by S’s beliefs in Q1 and in Q2)] 
is a typical example of a y-flow. Third, a helpful way of understanding the v- vs. y- distinction (whether for 
support or for flow) is to think in terms of overdetermination: v-flows are instances of justificatory 
overdetermination, whereas y-flows are not, and similarly relations of v-support involve overdetermined 
support, whereas relations of y-support do not. Fourth, the v- vs. y- distinction is perhaps the clearest way 
of seeing the dangers of assimilating a ramifying regress into a serial regress. It is easy to appreciate the 
importance of the v- vs. y- distinction, but there is no way to draw that distinction after we collapse a 
ramifying regress into a serial regress. 
4. Three Puzzles for Coherentists 
Each of our three distinctions is, on its own, fairly simple. However, when we put these three distinctions 
together, they have some powerful effects on how we think about justificatory structure. In particular, they 
give coherentists the resources to address a number of pressing puzzles that arise for their position. 
 Puzzle #1: It has become standard in the literature to distinguish between linear and holistic forms 
of coherentism. As their names suggest, linear coherentists accept a familiar linear conception of 
justification, whereas holistic coherentists take a more holistic approach to justification’s source. But what 
exactly does this distinction come to? Here is a typical explication of the difference, by Laurence BonJour: 
The only apparent hope for a coherentist response to this objection [that chains of justification 
cannot loop back on themselves], stemming originally from [Bernard] Bosanquet, is the 
suggestion that the objection depends on the plausible but ultimately mistaken idea that relations 
of justification fundamentally involve a linear, asymmetrical order of epistemic dependence among 
the beliefs in question. The contrary suggestion is that justification, when properly understood, is 
ultimately nonlinear and holistic in character, with all of the beliefs in the relevant system of beliefs 
standing in relations of mutual support, but none being epistemically prior to the others. (BonJour 
2003, 44–45) 
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BonJour’s general idea is clear. But it is difficult to extract from this passage a crisp definition of linear or 
holistic coherentism. Hence my first puzzle for coherentists: how precisely do we formulate this oft-made 
but somewhat-obscure distinction between linear and holistic varieties of coherentism? 
 As I see it, my distinction #2, between relations of support and flows of justification, is the key to 
the distinction between linear and holistic coherentism. Linear coherentists acknowledge both relations of 
support and flows of justification. Holistic coherentists, meanwhile, are fine with relations of support, but 
they deny the existence of flows of justification. According to holistic coherentists, a belief is never justified 
in virtue of standing in a relation of support with another belief that is justified: justification does not transfer 
or transmit from one belief to another via inferential relations. This difference between linear and holistic 
coherentists manifests in their attitudes toward directed hypergraphs of justificatory structure. For linear 
coherentists, the directed edges in those graphs can be interpreted either to designate relations of support or 
to designate flows of justification. (In my conventions: these graphs can include arrows as well as shadows 
under those arrows.) Holistic coherentists, on the other hand, will insist that the directed edges in those 
graphs be understood only as relations of support, not as flows of justification. (In my conventions: the 
graphs will include arrows but no shadows under those arrows.) 
 Thus I am proposing an interpretation on which the holistic coherentist, qua holist, is committed 
to no more and no less than the following: justification does not flow or transmit between beliefs.10 This 
way of understanding the commitments of holistic coherentism allows us to clear up some common 
confusions about the position, including the following: 
• It is sometimes said that holistic coherentists deny a presupposition of the regress argument. This 
is only half correct. We need to distinguish the regress of support, which is the regress we get when 
items in the regress are linked via relations of support, from the regress of justification, which is the 
regress we get when items in the regress are linked via flows of justification. It is only the latter 
regress which holistic coherentists deny a presupposition of. 
• Similarly, it is sometimes said that holistic coherentism is a form of foundationalism.11 Again, this 
is only half correct. There is a sense in which holistic coherentism is a foundationalist response to 
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the regress of justification—“one-step foundationalism,” as Klein (2005, 278) nicely puts it, in which 
every justified belief is justified in virtue of some property concerning its coherence with other 
beliefs, thereby obviating the need to continue the regress further than a single step. However, this 
characterization of holistic coherentists is not entirely fair, since holistic coherentists don’t think 
that the regress of justification—with its appeal to the transmission of justification as what binds 
together successive stages of that regress—is a legitimate one. Moreover, when we turn our 
attention to the regress of support, we find that holistic coherentism represents a decidedly non-
foundationalist response to that regress. 
• Finally, it is sometimes said that holistic coherentism makes the justification of a single belief 
depend on the coherence of one’s entire system of beliefs (and other justificatorily-relevant mental 
states). But holistic coherentism as such is committed to nothing of the sort. All it is committed to is 
a denial of flows of justification. This leaves it open that the justification of an individual belief 
might be determined by the coherence of some subsystem of one’s beliefs (and other 
justificatorily-relevant mental states). 
In what follows, I restrict myself to consideration of holistic forms of coherentism, since—like most 
authors—I consider holistic coherentism more defensible than linear coherentism.12 Thus in all future 
diagrams of justificatory structure, I will only draw arrows of support and will not be concerned with 
representing the flow of justification (since holistic coherentists deny the existence of such flow). 
 Puzzle #2: Coherence, it is often assumed, is exclusively a relation among beliefs (or propositions 
accessible to belief, or other doxastic entities of some sort—I will continue to focus on the case of belief). 
This leads to one of the most commonly cited objections to coherentism, in both its holistic and linear 
varieties: the so-called isolation objection or input problem. In brief, the worry is this: if justification depends 
only on the internal coherence of a system of beliefs, then justification does not require any contact or input 
from the world outside that system of beliefs—and, in particular, does not require one to take into account 
one’s experiences when forming and maintaining beliefs. But surely, the thought goes, this is implausible. 
Part of what it is to have justified beliefs is to respond appropriately to one’s experiences. If coherentism 
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cannot account for this truism, then so much the worse for coherentism. 
 The obvious response to this objection is to move to a view on which the bearers of coherence are 
not sets of beliefs alone, but rather sets of beliefs plus experiences. Such a form of coherentism is known as 
“non-doxastic coherentism.”13 Non-doxastic coherentism has much to recommend it, especially since it 
offers a nice, tidy response to what is often considered a knockdown objection to coherentism. But non-
doxastic coherentism is also a deeply puzzling position, which perhaps explains why it has not been widely 
embraced by those with coherentist sympathies. In particular, it is not clear how coherentists can include 
experiences among a coherent set of mental states without lapsing into foundationalism. After all, the 
items in a coherent set are supposed to be mutually supporting, and experiences (it is standardly assumed) 
are not the sort of mental state that can be supported by other mental states. So if experiences are to 
feature in a network of mutually supporting mental items, they must do so by providing support to other 
items in that network—and, in particular, by providing support to beliefs. However, if we allow that 
experiences are non-supported supporters of beliefs, haven’t we thereby committed ourselves to one of the 
central tenets of foundationalism? Thus it appears that coherentists are caught in a dilemma: if they deny 
experiences a justificatory role, they must face the isolation objection, but if they allow experiences to be 
justificatorily relevant, they risk becoming foundationalists. This is my second puzzle. 
 In order to see our way out of this puzzle, let us look more closely at the dilemma’s second horn. 
As we have already mentioned, one form of foundationalism—perhaps its most commonly defended 
form, nowadays—holds that there is a non-inferential variety of support that exists between an experience 
and a belief, in virtue of which basic beliefs are justified. Let us, somewhat anachronistically, refer to this 
kind of support as the categorical given.14 We have been pictorially representing it like so: 
 
Figure 8 
Note that an experience which provides support in this manner acts as a regress stopper: it offers support but 
is not itself in need of support, so our regress comes to an end. Moreover, I have been individuating 
foundationalism, infinitism, and coherentism—as is customary—in terms of their distinctive responses to 
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the regress problem. So if this is the only way in which an experience can support a belief, we are 
skewered by the second horn of our dilemma: taking experiences to be the sort of thing that can feature in 
a network of mutually supporting (and hence coherent) mental states commits us to foundationalism. 
 However, by combining my distinctions #1 and #3, we can see that there is another way for 
experiences to play a supporting role for beliefs. According to distinction #1, we should include both 
doxastic and experiential nodes in our diagrams of the structure of support for a belief. According to 
distinction #3, it can be the case that several nodes in such a diagram jointly support some other node. 
Put these ideas together, and we are left with the possibility that one (or more) experience nodes and one 
(or more) belief nodes might together support a given belief node. In graphic terms: 
 
Figure 9 
Adapting some terminology of Anil Gupta’s, let us call this kind of support the hypothetical given.15 
Candidates for (the content of) the belief on the right in Figure 9 could include any of the following: 
<Lighting conditions are normal>, <I haven’t ingested any hallucinogenic drugs recently>, <My visual 
faculties are generally reliable>, etc. But regardless of which belief—or beliefs—together with an 
experience—or experiences—act as a y-supporter for another belief, the crucial point is that a support 
structure of this kind does not act as a regress stopper. Presumably y-support of the sort depicted in Figure 
9 can only be part of what makes it the case that a belief is justified if the belief node on the right is itself 
supported by other nodes in our system. Thus coherentists who countenance the hypothetical given can 
allow experiences to play an epistemic role in the regress of support (and in their account of coherence) 
without taking experiences to be regress stoppers: experiences would provide epistemic friction in the 
system, but they would not generate support or justification ex nihilo.16 This solves our second puzzle.17 
 Puzzle #3: My final puzzle starts with the following tempting line of thought: “Isn’t a more 
accurate name for coherentism ‘circularism’? And isn’t circularism incredibly implausible? Why would 
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anyone hold that a belief can be justified in virtue of its having a circular chain of support?” In a way I 
have already raised this problem for coherentism in this essay’s opening pages. There I said that one 
important reason to formulate the regress problem in terms of the ramifying rather than the serial regress 
is that, within the confines of the serial regress, worries about circularity constitute a fatal objection to 
coherentism. However, it might seem puzzling why moving to the ramifying regress is any help here. After 
all, the coherentist response to the ramifying regress still involves an appeal to circular lines of support, 
albeit many such circular lines of support—one additional one for each ramification in our structure. But 
if a single circle is epistemically pernicious, shouldn’t multiple circles be just as pernicious, if not more? 
  It is here that distinction #3 (between v- and y-support) becomes crucial. It is not ramifications as 
such that help answer the anti-circularism challenge, but rather ramifications involving y-support. I agree 
with the hypothetical objector that circles of full support are not justification-making. However, I think that 
circles of partial support can be relevant to whether a belief is justified. Compare the following two (vastly 
oversimplified) toy models of what it might take for a set of beliefs to be coherent. First, let a circular triad be 
a set of three beliefs {bʹ′, bʹ′ʹ′, bʹ′ʹ′ʹ′} such that bʹ′ on its own supports bʹ′ʹ′, bʹ′ʹ′ on its own supports bʹ′ʹ′ʹ′, and bʹ′ʹ′ʹ′ on 
its own supports bʹ′. Pictorially: 
 
Figure 10 
Second, let an entwined triad be a set of three beliefs {b1, b2, b3} such that every two of them y-supports the 





Our objector is assuming, I believe, that a circular triad is the coherentist’s model for the sort of support 
structure that confers justification on a belief. But once we appreciate that coherentists usually take an 
entwined triad to be a better—albeit still imperfect—model for a justification-conferring support 
structure, the force of the objector’s challenge dissipates.18 
 It is important that we be clear here about the exact nature of our objector’s challenge. On one 
way of pressing that challenge, it involves a brute appeal to intuition. The objector has an intuition that 
circular support structures can’t underwrite a belief’s status as justified, and she takes this intuition to 
refute coherentism. She looks at Figure 10 and thinks, “Yuck! That can’t be what makes a belief justified.” 
I share the objector’s “yuck”-reaction to Figure 10. But when I consider entwined triads such as Figure 
11, I am less certain. It is far from clear to me that Figure 11 is hopeless as a model for the sort of support 
structure that can serve to make a belief justified, in the way in which Figure 10 seem hopeless. In short, 
the intuitive version of the anti-circularism objection is much less compelling when we consider structures 
in which the only circles of support are circles of partial support. 
 Moreover, there is a way in which the intuitive version of our objection is disappointing. Since 
(holistic) coherentism is defined in terms of its distinctive response to the regress of support, (holistic) 
coherentism is, by definition, a view according to which a circular support structure is required in order 
for a belief to be justified. So on the intuitive version of the anti-circularism challenge, our objector is 
doing little more than appealing to an intuition that (holistic) coherentism is false. That, in the end, is not 
the most insightful objection. If circular support structures are not justification-affording, we would like to 
know why they are not—to know what it is about such structures that makes them so problematic. 
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 Thus the anti-circularism objection is more powerful when it does not rest content with a bare 
intuition that circular support structures can’t ground justification, and instead fills in the worry in a way 
that gives it more teeth. Here is one way of doing so. Let us assume that inferential support among 
propositions obeys contraposition, so that if P supports Q (whether deductively, inductively, or 
abductively), then –Q supports –P (whether deductively, inductively, or abductively). It follows that if 
some subject’s beliefs in P, Q, and R together constitute a circular triad, then there is another possible 
subject whose beliefs in –P, –Q, and –R together constitute a circular triad in the reverse direction: the 
first subject’s belief in P supports her belief in Q, which supports her belief in R, which in turn supports 
her belief in P, whereas the second subject’s belief in –Q supports her belief in –P, which supports her 
belief in –R, which in turn supports her belief in –Q (see Figure 12).  
 
Figure 12 
So if circular triads are justification-affording, it follows that if the support relations among the first 
subject’s beliefs in P, Q, and R make each belief justified, the support relations among the second subject’s 
beliefs in –P, –Q, and –R make each of these beliefs justified. But, it might be insisted, this is an absurd 
result: the sorts of considerations that make belief in a set of propositions justified must be able to 
distinguish between those propositions and their negations. Hence, our objector concludes, circular triads 
cannot be justification-affording.19 
 This more specific version of the anti-circularism objection is, I believe, a forceful challenge to the 
view that circular triads can underwrite justification. But it is important to realize that this version of the 
objection is completely powerless against the view that entwined triads can underwrite justification. Suppose 
a subject’s beliefs in P, Q, and R together make up an entwined triad. How do we construct a negated 







support R, it doesn’t follow that –R by itself supports –P and –Q together—indeed, it’s not even clear 
what this claim means.20 So, when we try to construct an analogue of Figure 12 for entwined triads, we 
are left with the following: 
 
Figure 13 
 Thus I conclude that both the intuitive and the more specific version of the anti-circularism 
charge lose much of their force when applied to proposals on which it is circles of partial support, rather 
than circles of full support, which undergird coherentist justification. Moreover, matters look even better 
for the coherentist when we allow experiences into our support structures via an appeal to the 
hypothetical given. For example, consider what I will call an entwined sextet: three beliefs and three 
experiences {b1, b2, b3, e1, e2, e3} such that {b1, b2, e3} supports b3, {b1, b3, e2} supports b2, and {b2, b3, e1} 
supports b1. As a graph: 
 
Figure 14 
I doubt that there actually exist three beliefs and three experiences which bear these particular support 
relations to one another. But if such a sextet were to exist, I don’t think the presence of circles of partial 







justification on the beliefs contained therein. So when we take an entwined sextet to be our model for the 
sort of structure that gives rise to coherentist justification, the intuitive version of the anti-circularism 
objection completely lapses. The more specific version of that objection which we have been considering 
also lapses: it is even more difficult to construct a negated analogue of a given entwined sextet than it is to 
construct a negated analogue of a given entwined triad. The lesson, once again, is that worries about 
circularity only seem crippling to coherentists when we neglect the possibility of y-support. 
5. A New Way of Characterizing Coherence 
The distinction between circular triads and entwined triads/sextets is not just a way of making 
“circularist” responses to the regress of support look less problematic; it also points us toward something 
more important: a way of providing a substantive characterization of what coherence comes to. 
 The basic idea here is simple. The differences between a circular triad, an entwined triad, and an 
entwined sextet are the kinds of differences we can express in graph-theoretic terms—that is, in terms of 
the properties and relations encoded by the sorts of directed hypergraphs we have been considering. So if 
an entwined triad or an entwined sextet is closer to the type of structure that constitutes a coherent set of 
mental states than a circular triad is, we have good evidence that coherence itself is expressible in graph-
theoretic terms. 
 More boldly, we may argue as follows. Coherence, we have been assuming, is a matter of the 
structure of support among a subject’s beliefs, experiences, and other justificatorily-relevant mental states 
at a given time. But we can use directed hypergraphs to represent all of those support relations. That is, 
we can use directed hypergraphs to represent all of the relations that have a bearing on coherence. 
Moreover, ways of combining graph-theoretic notions are also graph-theoretic notions. So it follows that 
coherence is itself expressible as a graph-theoretic property of our directed hypergraphs. 
 Which graph-theoretic property, though? That, of course, is the tricky part. Here is an example of 
the sort of proposal I have in mind. Suppose we are working with the hypothesis that coherence is a 
graph-theoretic property possessed by an entwined triad and an entwined sextet, but not possessed by a 
circular triad. Then there is a natural way of extending this hypothesis into an account of coherence and 
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of coherentist justification. Let a thread of support from node x to node y be a path of partial support that starts 
at x and ends at y. Let a web of support from (non-empty) set of nodes N to node y be a path of full support that 
starts at all of the members of N and ends at y.21 Now, because deduction is monotonic, extra webs in a 
given structure are easy to come by: if set of nodes N deductively supports node y, and if N* is an arbitrary 
set of nodes, it follows that from the monotonicity of deduction that N ∪ N* deductively support y, and 
hence that there is a web from N ∪ N* to y. So let us say that a web from N to y is superseded when (and 
only when) there exists a web from a proper subset of N to y. Then the proposal I have in mind makes the 
following two central claims: 
(C1) Set of nodes N is coherent if and only if, and because, for every two belief nodes b1 and b2 in 
N, there is a non-superseded web of support from b1 and at least one other member of N 
to b2. 
(C2) Belief b is justified if and only if, and because, there exists a set of nodes, N, such that (i) N 
is coherent, and (ii) b is a member of N. 
(C1) tells us what it takes for a set of beliefs, experiences, and other justificatorily-relevant mental states to 
be coherent. (C2) tells us what it takes for an individual belief to be justified. Together, they constitute a 
graph-theoretic form of coherentism about epistemic justification. 
 I don’t mean to be endorsing this specific theory; in fact, I think there are fatal problems with it, 
which I shall get to momentarily. Rather, I bring up (C1) and (C2) in order to illustrate a way of 
characterizing coherence—and of formulating coherentism—that is very different from the approaches 
one finds in the contemporary literature. That literature is dominated by two general approaches. 
According to the probabilistic approach, coherence is taken to be a property of sets of propositions that bear 
certain probabilistic relations to one another—the debate being over which specific probabilistic relations 
are the right ones. According to the weighted-sum approach, we first provide a list of various coherence-increasing 
factors (such as the degree to which the beliefs in a set are connected to one another) and various coherence-
decreasing factors (such as the fact that the beliefs in a set are inconsistent with one another). Coherence is 
then taken to be determined by a weighted sum of the coherence-increasing factors minus a weighted sum 
of the coherence-decreasing factors. 
Much important work has been done in both of these traditions. But I also think each tradition 
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has its shortcomings. One major problem with the probabilistic approach is that it cannot allow 
experiences to play a role in determining coherence. Suppose {P1, . . . , Pn} is a set of n propositions which 
bear the right probabilistic relations to one another to make for coherence, according to a given version of 
the probabilistic approach. Then if I believe each of {P1, . . . , Pn}, the corresponding set of n beliefs counts 
as coherent, regardless of their relation to my experiences. For this reason advocates of the probabilistic 
approach are forced to endorse doxastic coherentism, and hence must face the isolation objection.22 The 
weighted-sum approach, on the other hand, tends to be developed in a way that is unsatisfyingly vague: 
usually almost nothing is said either about how the individual coherence-increasing and -decreasing 
factors are precisely measured or about how they are weighed against each other in the determination of 
overall coherence. Similarly, we are rarely given a reason to think the proposed list of coherence-
increasing and -decreasing factors is exhaustive, or to think that all of the items in the list are independent 
of one another. Although these considerations do not constitute a decisive objection to the weighted-sum 
tradition (perhaps it is a mistake to look for too much precision in a theory of coherence), they give us 
good reason to search for a more systematic way of conducting our inquiries into the nature of 
coherence.23 
 My graph-theoretic approach is, I believe, precisely such a more systematic approach. By using 
the tools of graph theory, we can theorize about the factors that make for coherence and incoherence in a 
rigorous manner. The approach is also more versatile than the probabilistic approach, since it easily 
allows for the bearers of coherence to include experiences and other non-doxastic states. But this is not to 
say that the graph-theoretic approach is entirely independent of the two mainstream approaches to 
coherence. Many of the coherence-increasing and -decreasing factors identified by advocates of the 
weighted-sum approach will be ones which the proponent of the graph-theoretic approach will want to 
account for in graph-theoretic terms, and which she can incorporate into her graph-theoretic analysis of 
coherence. Similarly, many of the proposals that have been made in the probabilistic literature on 
coherence will have graph-theoretic analogues, so the lessons learned in that literature can have bearing 
on how we think about graphic coherence. 
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 Let us return to our example of a graph-theoretic account of coherence and justification, namely 
(C1) and (C2). (C1) is a natural candidate for the graph-theoretic property that distinguishes structures like 
an entwined triad or sextet from structures like a circular triad: we want all of the beliefs in the structure to 
support each other by way of threads that are part of a larger non-superseded web, not by way of threads 
that are themselves webs. So if we are searching for a graph-theoretic property that is possessed by 
entwined triads and sextets and not possessed by circular triads, (C1) is a good start. Moreover, (C2) is a 
natural way of moving from an account of coherence to a full theory of justified belief.24 
 Nevertheless, (C1) and (C2) are inadequate as they stand. There are clear counterexamples to the 
criterion for justified belief provided by (C1) and (C2) in both directions: failures both of necessity and of 
sufficiency. Let us consider problems of necessity first. It is very plausible to think that justified belief is 
closed under inferential support, in the following sense: 
single-premise closure: If S believes P, S believes P+, S’s belief in P is justified, and S’s belief in P 
deductively (or inductively, or abductively) supports S’s belief in P+, then S’s belief in P+ is 
justified.25 
Single-premise closure is difficult to square with (C1) and (C2). Suppose the principle’s antecedent is 
satisfied. In order to satisfy its consequent, we need there to exist a set of nodes N containing S’s belief in 
P+ which is coherent in the way specified by (C1). And in order for N to be coherent in the way specified 
by (C1), it must at least be the case that there is a thread of support from S’s belief in P+ to some other 
belief of S’s. But the conditions in the antecedent of our principle give us no assurance that S’s belief in P+ 
partially supports any other belief which S holds: P+ might be a very abstruse consequence of P, and her 
belief in P+ might be the only belief she currently holds that is at all relevant to this abstruse issue. (For 
example, let P+ be the disjunction of P and some utterly inane proposition about some completely trivial 
matter.)26 
 Luckily, there is an obvious way to patch up our proposal so that it satisfies single-premise closure. 
All we need to do is replace (C2) with 
(C2*) Belief b is justified if and only if, and because, there exists a set of nodes N such that (i) N is 
coherent, and (ii) there is a non-superseded web of support from some subset of N to b. 
It is easily shown that (C1) plus (C2*) together entail single-premise closure. (Just take the non-superseded 
 24 
web of support which makes S’s belief in P justified and append to it the link between S’s belief in P and 
S’s belief in P+ to create a non-superseded web of support that makes S’s belief in P+ justified.) And when 
we adjust our account of justified belief in this way, the threat to its necessity is removed.27, 28  
 Threats to the account’s sufficiency, however, are not so easily removed. There are at least two 
problems here. First, a major limitation of (C1) and (C2*) is that although they allow experiences to play a 
role in justifying beliefs, they do not require one to take heed of one’s experiences when forming beliefs. 
This is a consequence of the fact that, from (C1)’s perspective, an entwined triad is just as good a candidate 
for a coherent set of mental states as an entwined sextet is: in both structures, there is a path of partial 
support from each belief in the structure to every other belief in the structure, and whether any of those 
paths of partial support requires the assistance of an experience node in order to constitute a path of full 
support is irrelevant, so far as (C1) is concerned. Thus one could count as having a justified belief in virtue 
of holding an entwined triad of beliefs even if those beliefs are wildly at odds with one’s experiences. For 
this reason, we need a stronger connection between justification and experience in order to avoid the 
isolation objection. 
 The second problem with the combination of (C1) and (C2*) is more straightforward: there are 
clear counterexamples to the proposal’s sufficiency. Consider the following trio of propositions: {P & Q, 
Q & R, R & P}, for arbitrary P, Q, and R. Any two of these propositions deductively y-supports the third. 
So it follows that a belief in P & Q, a belief in Q & R, and a belief in R & P are an entwined triad. Thus if 
we pick our P, Q, and R such that no one of them supports any of the others on its own, we are saddled 
with the result that all it takes, according to (C1) and (C2*), to have a justified belief in one of these three 
conjunctive propositions is to believe the other two. But that’s absurd. I can’t justifiably believe <I will live 
forever, and there are infinitely many primes> just by also believing <There are infinitely many primes, 
and my son’s favorite color is red> and <My son’s favorite color is red, and I will live forever>. 
 The lesson from both of these problems is that our initial hypothesis that coherence is a property 
possessed by entwined triads and entwined sextets but not by circular triads was mistaken. In particular, it 
is not true that every instance of an entwined triad constitutes a coherent set of mental states: more 
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structure is needed. Now there are a number of ways in which we might revise (C1) and (C2*) in order to 
provide that extra structure. In my opinion, the best way of doing so is to relax an assumption we made at 
the outset of this essay, and to consider negative structural relations in our hypergraphs in addition to 
positive relations of support. However, that is not a claim I will defend here. After all, my purpose in this 
section has been to illustrate a certain way of thinking about coherence and coherentism that is very 
different from the main approaches one encounters in the literature. (C1) and (C2*) serve that purpose, 
even if there are serious objections to the claim that they constitute a fully adequate coherentist theory of 
justification. I think it should be clear that the two objections we have been considering are only 
objections to this specific proposal, not objections to my entire graph-theoretic approach. 
6. Is Graph-Theoretic Coherence Truth-Conducive? 
Still, there are other objections that might be taken to refute the entire graph-theoretic approach. I want 
to end by considering one objection of that sort. 
 A large portion of the literature on probabilistic approaches to coherence is devoted to the 
following question: is coherence, when construed probabilistically, truth-conducive? The reason this 
question has loomed large is twofold. First, it is commonly assumed that a “no”-answer to the question is a 
decisive objection to coherentism: epistemic justification must be truth-conducive, the thought goes, so if 
coherence is not truth-conducive, coherentist accounts of epistemic justification are false. Second, the 
question “Is probabilistically-construed coherence truth-conducive?” has loomed large because a number 
of authors have argued either—more modestly—that many specific accounts of coherence in probabilistic 
terms yield a notion of coherence that is not truth-conducive, or—more boldly—that any account of 
coherence in probabilistic terms must have this unfortunate result.29 
 We can imagine a similar objection being levied against graph-theoretic understandings of 
coherence. Graphic coherence, it might be claimed, is not truth-conducive: that sort of a structural 
relation among one’s mental states does not in general promote the acquisition of true beliefs and the 
avoidance of false ones. And, the objection continues, this fact gives us good reason to reject the idea that 
epistemic justification is grounded in graphic coherence. 
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 The problem with this objection, I believe, is with its background assumption that epistemic 
justification must be truth-conducive. In other work, I have argued that although the slogan “Truth-
conduciveness is the mark of epistemic justification” is widely endorsed by contemporary epistemologists, 
that slogan represents a distinctively consequentialist way of understanding epistemic normativity which 
should be rejected.30 In my view, it is simply not true that epistemic justification is a matter of what best 
promotes, either as an objective matter of fact or from the subject’s own perspective, the overall balance of 
epistemically good outcomes (such as the obtaining of true beliefs) minus epistemically bad outcomes (such 
as the obtaining of false beliefs). So in response to the question, “Is graph-theoretic coherence truth-
conducive?” I reply, “Who cares? Truth-conduciveness is the wrong thing to be looking for when 
theorizing about epistemic justification.” 
 The two most prominent coherentists of the previous generation, Laurence BonJour and Keith 
Lehrer, were also truth-conducivists, albeit truth-conducivists of a subjective consequentialist sort, and 
their commitment to truth-conducivism profoundly influenced the way they developed and defended 
coherentism.31 Because of this, BonJour and Lehrer were not, at the most fundamental level, coherentists. 
For both of them, the most fundamental epistemic property—that which ultimately grounds all other 
epistemic properties—was truth-conduciveness-from-the-subject’s-perspective; having coherent beliefs 
was, for them, merely a way—perhaps the only way—of acquiring beliefs with that desired property. This 
is not true coherentism. It is like a utilitarian who says that the Principle of Utility describes our most 
fundamental moral duty, but the best way to conform to that duty is to internalize Kant’s Categorical 
Imperative. That is not true Kantianism. 
 Thus in order to truly defend coherentism, we must renounce the idea that there is a more 
fundamental epistemic standard—conducing toward the true and away from the false—to which the 
coherentist epistemic standard must answer.32 In this way, I view the current essay as an exploration of 
non-consequentialist epistemology. It is not the only way of developing a non-consequentialist epistemic 
theory—there also exist non-consequentialist versions of foundationalism and infinitism, as well as various 
hybrid views. But it is an approach I consider particularly fruitful. 
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 Moreover, let me remind the reader of a point with which I began this essay. Although I have 
been emphasizing the ways in which the graph-theoretic resources I have been developing here are of use 
to coherentists (whether of a consequentialist or non-consequentialist sort), those resources should also be 
of interest to infinitists and foundationalists (again, whether of a consequentialist or non-consequentialist 
sort). For nearly every objection or puzzle that arises for coherentism, there is a parallel objection or 
puzzle that arises for infinitism: infinitists also make a vague but ubiquitous distinction between linear and 
holistic forms of their view, infinitists also must explain how they can reply to the isolation objection 
without secretly becoming foundationalists, etc. So my graph-theoretic strategies for replying to these 
objections and puzzles can be employed by infinitists as well. And, in the case of foundationalism, 
although much of what I say here is not of concern to foundationalists when developing their account of 
immediate justification, foundationalists may want to appeal to some of my graph-theoretic machinery 
when providing an account of how mediately justified beliefs depend on immediately justified ones (since 
many traditional foundationalists appeal to a notion of coherence at this stage in their story). Any 
plausible epistemic theory must recognize that there can be complicated and subtle structural relations 
among our beliefs that have a bearing on their epistemic standing; so any plausible epistemic theory 
should aspire to theorize about the nature of epistemic structure in as rigorous a manner as possible.33 
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1  See, for example, Alston 1976, 30; Klein 2005, 276; and Cling 2008, 403n3. 
2  As, for instance, in the massive literature spawned by Klein and Warfield 1994. See Olsson 2008 for 
overview. 
3  Prominent examples of this approach include BonJour 1985 and Sayre-McCord 1996. 
4  See Berker MS-a. 
5  We might need to add to (i) and (ii) a condition according to which S believes P on the basis of her belief in 
Q1, . . . , Qn and their support of P. I will be setting aside complications of this sort relating to the basing relation. 
6  Although my terminology here is, I believe, widespread, it is not universal. For instance, in a recent series of 
articles Andrew Cling (2008, 2009, 2014) uses the word “support” differently from how I do: for Cling, the 
expressions “supports” and “is a reason for” are synonymous. That is not how I will be using the word “support.”  
 All “support”-talk in epistemology is metaphorical, and there is no single correct way to interpret that 
metaphor. Nevertheless, here is one reason to prefer my way of using the word “support” over Cling’s: given Cling’s 
terminology, coherentists cannot accept the common claim just mentioned in the text, namely that coherence is a 
matter of mutual support among one’s beliefs. If mutual support is what makes it the case that we have coherence, 
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and if coherence is what makes it the case that we have reasons, and if the reason relation just is the support relation, 
then we are caught in an explanatory circle. (I assume here that circles of ground are vicious.) 
7  One frequently encounters the phrase “unjustified justifiers” in the literature, but it is more accurate to refer 
to these beliefs as “non-justified justifiers,” since they are neither justified nor unjustified (they stand outside the 
realm of justification). I take the term “non-justified” from Goldman 1992, 159. 
8  For certain purposes it might be useful to draw different arrows for different types of support (for example, a 
solid arrow for deductive support, a dotted arrow for inductive support, and so on). I will be ignoring such 
complexities in this essay. 
9  And maybe because various other conditions are satisfied as well, if more is needed for the transmittance of 
justification. 
10  Or, at least, this is what a pure holistic coherentist is committed to. There is also the possibility of a mixed 
holistic/linear coherentist view, according to which some beliefs are justified on holistic coherentist grounds, without 
any appeal to the flow of justification, but those beliefs are able to transfer justification along inferential lines to other 
beliefs that are not justified on holistic coherentist grounds. On the possibility of such a view, see Plantinga 1993, 79, 
and Elgin 1996, 17n5. In the text, whenever I speak of “holistic coherentism,” I mean “pure holistic coherentism.” 
11  A claim most famously due to Ernest Sosa (1980a, 154; 1980b, 180), but also echoed by Alvin Plantinga 
(1993, 78–80), Peter Klein (2005, 278; 2011, 250–51), Scott Aikin (2011, 2, 110), and Michael DePaul (2011, 237), 
among others. 
12  Why? Because linear coherentists are committed to justified belief requiring a circle of partial ground (a 
series of facts such that each partially grounds the next, together with the last partially grounding the first). Under the 
assumption that some of our beliefs are justified, this commitment goes against orthodoxy in metaphysics, where 
most theorists (Schaffer 2009; Rosen 2010; Fine 2012a, 2012b) hold that the grounding relation is both transitive 
and irreflexive, two properties which together entail that there cannot exist circles of partial ground. Even though I 
am open to the possibility that this orthodoxy among metaphysicians might be mistaken, I don’t wish to rest 
anything in the current essay on that possibility. For my own views on the nature of grounding, see Berker MS-c. 
13  More generally, non-doxastic coherentism refers to any coherentist theory on which the bearers of 
coherence are sets that include both doxastic and non-doxastic items. See Pollock 2001, 41–42; Lyons 2009, 21; 
Roche 2012, 274; and Poston 2014, 10. James Pryor (2005, 207) calls this view “impure coherentism,” but I dislike 
that name, since it suggests that it is somehow more in the nature of coherentism to restrict coherence to a relation 
among only beliefs. For some forceful arguments against this suggestion, see Kvanvig and Riggs 1992. 
14  I say “somewhat anachronistically” because the traditional doctrine of the given has more built into it than 
simply a commitment to experiences being non-supported supporters of beliefs. 
15  See Gupta 2006, §4A. My use of the term “hypothetical given” deviates from Gupta’s in two ways. First, 
Gupta is not always clear on whether the hypothetical given is defined in terms of y-support or defined in terms of 
the y-flow of justification: much of his language suggests the latter (see Berker 2011, 21n8), but the analogy he draws 
between the hypothetical given and logical entailment suggests the former (see Gupta 2006, 80–82). (In Berker 2011, 
I interpreted Gupta as holding that the hypothetical given is a type of y-flow, because that is what best fits the textual 
evidence, but I now think Gupta is better off taking the hypothetical given to be a type of y-support and revising his 
language accordingly.) I, on the other hand, use the term “the hypothetical given” exclusively to pick out a certain 
sort of y-support relation. The second difference between my terminology and Gupta’s is that, for Gupta, it is not a 
belief (or set of beliefs) which together with an experience justifies/supports a given belief, but rather what he calls a 
view: a set of concepts, conceptions, and beliefs. I have not included concepts and conceptions among the items 
which together with an experience provide support because I do not see how concepts and conceptions on their own, 
when not deployed in specific beliefs, can help make it the case that a support relation obtains. 
 Another terminology note: my distinction between “categorical” and “hypothetical” forms of the given (and 
hence of perceptual support) is not the same as Pryor’s distinction between “categorical” and “hypothetical” forms of 
inferential support in his 2012, 285. Pryor’s distinction there is closer to my earlier distinction between flows of 
justification and relations of support. 
16  A similar story can be told about other non-doxastic nodes. For example, if intuitions are non-doxastic 
states that, together with certain beliefs, are able to support other beliefs, then coherentists can take coherence to be 
a property of sets of beliefs, experiences, and intuitions without lapsing into foundationalism. (In fact, I myself am 
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most interested in applying the form of coherentism developed here to the epistemology of intuitions about 
normative matters, but I will continue to focus on experiences as my non-doxastic node of choice in the text.) 
17  My proposal here is not entirely new, but I think presenting it in terms of support structures like that found 
in Figure 9 is an improvement over existing proposals in the vicinity. For example, in an important article, Jonathan 
Kvanvig and Wayne Riggs (1992) argue that coherentists can appeal to “appearance states” (i.e. non-factive 
experiences) if they take a given appearance state to be an INUS condition for justified belief, in J. L. Mackie’s (1974) 
sense: an Insufficient but Non-redundant condition for [S is justified in believing P] which is part of a larger 
condition that is itself Unnecessary but Sufficient for the obtaining of that fact. There are two problems here. First, 
by appealing to Mackie’s notion of an INUS condition, Kvanvig and Riggs open themselves to all of counterintuitive 
consequences that come with that notion (and which have led to the general abandonment of Mackie’s INUS 
analysis of causation). Second, what Kvanvig and Riggs are suggesting is in effect the analogue of Figure 9 where 
instead of y-support we have a y-flow of justification, so their proposal is of no use to holistic coherentists who deny 
that justification flows or transmits from one node in our structure to the next. 
 Similarly, here is Pryor’s (2005, 207) description of how non-doxastic coherentism is possible: “Impure [i.e. 
non-doxastic] coherentists are willing to give some non-beliefs, such as perceptual experiences, a justifying role. They 
will just deny that those states are able to justify a belief all by themselves. They can only do so in cooperation with 
other justified beliefs.” But, again, this proposal is formulated in terms that assume a linear conception of 
justification, and thus is not the sort of thing that can be endorsed by holistic coherentists. 
18  After the main ideas in this paper were developed, I discovered that I. T. Oakley (1976, 225) and William 
Roche (2012, 268) also mention the sort of structure I call an entwined triad when discussing coherentism, although 
not to make the point I make here. 
19  I am inspired here by Cling 2009, 341. Note that this version of the anti-circularism objection makes it into 
a version of another oft-cited worry for coherentism, namely the so-called alternative-systems objection. However, there is 
an important difference between this version of the alternative-systems objection and the version that is usually 
discussed. According to the standard version of the alternative-systems objection, all forms of coherentism are 
committed to the following: if a given subject has a justified belief in P in virtue of that belief being part of a coherent 
system of beliefs, then there is another possible subject who has a justified belief in –P in virtue of that belief being 
part of a different, equally coherent system of beliefs. I agree with Richard Feldman (2003, 67) that this result should not be 
particularly worrisome for coherentists. But the result we are considering here is more troubling. For now 
coherentists appear to be committed to the following: if a given subject has a justified belief in P in virtue of that 
belief being part of a certain system of beliefs, then there is another possible subject who has a justified belief in –P in 
virtue of that belief being part of a system of beliefs whose propositional contents are the negations of the propositional contents of the 
beliefs in the first system. 
20  It is true that, in the case of deductive support, if P and Q together deductively support R, then –R and Q 
together deductively support –P. However: (i) it is doubtful that an analogous claim holds for inductive or abductive 
support, and (ii) this claim doesn’t help us show that if belief in P, Q, and R constitutes an entwined triad, then belief 
in –P, Q, and –R can constitute an entwined triad, since it is not clear how we can derive the result that –P and –R 
together support Q. 
21  Here I am relying on an intuitive understanding of what a path of partial or full support amounts to. For 
more formal definitions of these notions, see Berker MS-a. 
22  Can partisans of the probabilistic approach resist this argument by (i) assuming that experiences have 
propositional content and (ii) insisting that an experience with a given propositional content plays a justificatory role 
if its propositional content together with various other propositions the subject believes constitute a coherent set of 
propositions? No, they cannot. Consider one natural proposal along these lines: 
(*)  Set of mental states {experience with content P1, . . . , experience with content Pm, belief with content 
Pm+1, . . . , belief with content Pn} is coherent if and only if set of propositions {P1, . . . , Pm, Pm+1 . . . , 
Pn} is coherent on probabilistic grounds. 
Now suppose {P1, . . . , Pn} is a coherent set of propositions, and compare the following: 
case 1: I have an experience with content P1, I believe P2, . . . , I believe Pn. 
case 2: I believe P1, I believe P2, . . . , I believe Pn. 
It is not true that my mental life is equally coherent in these two cases, but (*) commits us to this unfortunate result. 
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 What about a slightly different proposal, in which we make the fact of one’s having a given experience, 
rather than the content of that experience, be what coheres with the other propositions one believes? For example, 
consider 
(**) Set of mental states {experience with content P1, . . . , experience with content Pm, belief with content 
Pm+1, . . . , belief with content Pn} is coherent if and only if set of propositions {<I have an experience 
with content P1>, . . . , <I have an experience with content Pm>, Pm+1, . . . , Pn} is coherent on 
probabilistic grounds. 
But again we have trouble. Suppose {<I have an experience with content P1>, P2, . . . , Pn} is a coherent set of 
propositions. Then (**) is not able to account for the obvious difference in coherence between the following two 
cases: 
case 3: I have an experience with content P1, I believe P2, . . . , I believe Pn. 
case 4: I believe <I have an experience with content P1>, I believe P2, . . . , I believe Pn. 
In Berker MS-b I argue that similar problems face all attempts to extend the probabilistic approach to non-doxastic 
forms of coherentism. 
23   There is also a deeper problem with the weighted-sum approach. Why do the various coherence-increasing 
and -decreasing factors combine together into one notion which only then grounds justification, rather than each 
being its own source of some pro tanto good- or bad-making feature of belief? For further elaboration of this point, see 
Berker MS-b. 
24  Here is another attractive feature of the combination of (C1) and (C2). They obey the following plausible 
principle: 
counterclosure: If S believes P, S believes Q, S’s belief in P is justified, and S’s belief in P is justified partially in 
virtue of being deductively (or inductively, or abductively) supported by S’s belief in Q (either on its own or 
with the help of other beliefs), then S’s belief in Q is justified. 
The proof of this is straightforward. Suppose the antecedent of the above principle is satisfied. Then S’s belief in P is 
justified in virtue of being a member of some coherent set of nodes N that includes in it a belief in Q which 
deductively (or inductively, or abductively) supports S’s belief in P. So S’s belief in Q is a member of a coherent set of 
nodes, and hence is justified. 
 It is important to distinguish counterclosure from a closely related principle that only advocates of a linear 
conception of justification will find plausible: 
linear counterclosure: If S believes P, S believes Q, S’s belief in P is justified, and S’s belief in P is justified 
partially in virtue of being deductively (or inductively, or abductively) supported by S’s belief in Q (either on 
its own or with the help of other beliefs), then: S’s belief in Q is justified and S’s belief in P is justified partially in 
virtue of S’s belief in Q being justified. 
The combination of (C1) and (C2), being a form of holistic coherentism, does not entail linear counterclosure. Given 
(C1) and (C2), it is only justified beliefs which can make it the case that some belief they inferentially support is 
justified, but it is not in virtue of those beliefs being justified that they play this role. Rather, what we have is a 
common-ground structure: that which makes it the case that the supporting beliefs are able to help ground the 
supported belief’s status as justified also makes it the case that the supporting beliefs are themselves justified. 
25  We might need to add a clause in the antecedent specifying that S believes P+ on the basis of her belief in P 
and its inferentially support of P+ (or maybe we don’t, if we have already built a basing condition into our account of 
support among beliefs: see n. 5). I will be ignoring this complication, since it doesn’t affect my overall point. 
26  There are those who doubt that single-premise closure holds with full generality; see, for example, 
Schechter 2013. However, even those who doubt the general truth of single-premise closure usually concede that it 
holds in most cases, and that is all I need for the argument in this paragraph. Many individual cases in which it is 
extremely plausible that single-premise closure holds would not be ones in which it holds if (C1) and (C2) are true. 
27  The combination of (C1) and (C2*) is a natural candidate for the sort of mixed holistic/linear coherentist 
theory mentioned in n. 10, if we add to it the claim that any belief which is justified according to (C2*) but not 
according to (C2) is justified in virtue of having a non-superseded web of support which originates in a set of justified 
beliefs. (This is compatible with that belief also being justified in virtue of having a non-superseded web of support 
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which originates in a set of nodes that are part of a coherent set: what we have here is a case in which X grounds Y, 
Y grounds Z, and X also grounds Z.) 
28  It is easy enough to complicate (C2*) to make it compatible with multi-premise closure, if we are so inclined. 
29  The literature on this topic is vast. For a helpful overview, see Olsson 2008. For a book-length argument 
that probabilistic coherence is not truth-conducive, see Olsson 2005. For a catalogue of nearly all the contributions 
to the debate, see Roche 2013, 59n2. 
30  See Berker 2013a, 2013b, and 2015. 
31  As should be apparent to anyone who reads BonJour 1985 and Lehrer 1974, the classic statements of their 
respective coherentist views. For further evidence that BonJour is a (subjective) truth-conducivist, see Berker 2013a, 
352–53. 
32  William Lycan (2012, 18) makes a similar point. 
33  This essay supersedes an earlier manuscript with the title “Graphic Coherence.” For comments on that 
manuscript, I thank Tyler Doggett, Tom Donaldson, Hilary Kornblith, Lisa Miracchi, Ram Neta, Jim Pryor, 
Gustavo Ribeiro, Susanna Siegel, Jonathan Vogel, and Jonathan Weisberg. For discussion of this material, I also 
thank Nazım Adaklı, Scott Aikin, David Atkinson, David Christensen, Jamie Dreier, Kate Elgin, Nina Emery, 
Jeremy Fantl, Jeremy David Fix, Bryan Frances, Tobias Fuchs, Georgi Gardiner, Stephen Grimm, Paul Guyer, 
Richard Heck, Chris Hill, Xingming Hu, Mike Huemer, İlhan İnan, Matthew Jernberg, Peter Klein, Amanda 
MacAskill, Elizabeth Miller, Jeanne Peijnenburg, Ted Poston, Michael Rescorla, Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, Joshua 
Schechter, Andrew Sciarretta, Jada Twedt Strabbing, Stephen Wilf, Michael Williams, Reed Winegar, and 
audiences at Brown University, Fordham University, Harvard University, Sabancı University, and the Workshop on 
Infinite Regresses at Vanderbilt University. Special thanks go to Jeff Overall; many of the ideas in this essay were 
inspired by conversations we had while he was writing his senior thesis under my direction in 2010–11. Work on this 
essay was generously supported by fellowships from the American Council of Learned Societies and the Radcliffe 
Institute for Advanced Study. 
